E.O. Wilson getting religion wrong

I just finished reading E.O. Wilson's The Social Conquest of Earth.  Written as it was for an educated yet not academically minded audience it is hardly surprising that I didn't learn much new from the book.  Nevertheless, it should serve as a handy reference for teaching in the future and I found it refreshing to see the multi-level selection approach so forcefully promoted even if, in some places, I believe Wilson overstated the case.  Unfortunately, Wilson makes a number of unwarranted and poorly informed attacks against religion.  In the future, I may take each of these in turn.  For the moment, however, I'd like to comment on one in particular since it touches on my own research.

Wilson makes a number of impassioned pleas toward the end of the book about the critical juncture the human species finds itself at.  As might be expected from a biologist, his loudest cries are for the state of the environment:

Sure one moral precept we can agree on is to stop destroying our birthplace, the only home humanity will ever have.

That's certainly a moral precept I can agree on and one that I feel rather strongly about as well.  However, Wilson goes on to say:

It will be useful in taking a second look at science and religion to understand the true nature of the search for objective truth.  Science is not just another enterprise like medicine or engineering or theology.  It is the wellspring of all the knowledge we have of the real world that can be tested and fitted into preexisting knowledge.  It is the arsenal of technologies and inferential mathematics needed to distinguish the true from the false.  It formulates the principles and formulas that tie all this knowledge together.  Science belongs to everybody.  Its constituent parts can be challenged by anybody in the world who has sufficient information to do so.  It is not just "another way of knowing" as often claimed, making it coequal with religious faith.  The conflict between scientific knowledge and the teachings of organized religions is irreconcilable.  The chasm will continue to widen and cause no end of trouble as long as religious leaders go on making unsupportable claims about supernatural causes of reality.

To put this into better perspective, Wilson just a few paragraphs earlier said:

Why, then, is it wise openly to question the myths and gods of organized religion?  Because they are stultifying and divisive.  Because each is just one version of a competing multitude of scenarios that possibly can be true.  Because they encourage ignorance, distract people from recognizing problems of the real world, and often lead them in wrong directions into disastrous actions.

So now we get to the heart of my objection.  As I read it, Wilson is essentially trying to lay the blame for environmental degradation at the feet of religion.  Moreover, he suggests that the only antidote to the destructive nature of religion's superstition is the cold rationality of the scientific enterprise.

This is particularly obnoxious to me because I have been working for the past year and a half on a project with some of Lin Ostrom's students that looks specifically at the relationship between religion and the management of natural resources.  We still have two more cases to code before we begin our analysis.  Nevertheless, it is clear from the 48 cases that we've looked at so far that religion has traditionally had extremely important roles to play in the sustainable use of resources.  For instance, religion often serves to define the physical boundaries of resources and marks those who are allowed to use them.  Religion serves monitoring functions and imposes sanctions for those who break the rules.  It also is an important source of perceived benefits that encourage users to cooperate with others.  Religion provides opportunities for leadership, repositories of local knowledge, calendars to coordinate cooperative efforts and avenues for the establishment and maintenance of social capital.  To say that religion in this context is "stultifying and divisive" is plain and simply wrong.  It is both highly innovative and creative and it leads to greater cooperation for an enterprise that is notoriously difficult.

Now, I can hear the objections already that religion is hardly necessary to provide these services.  This is a fair point.  Indeed, many groups do use secular alternatives to great effect.  Furthermore, many groups that we've studied employ a mixture of religious and secular mechanisms to govern their resources sustainably.  Nevertheless, the fact that religion is providing these vital functions should alone be enough to give us pause about actively working to undermine them.  At least it should give us pause if our primary goal is really better stewardship of the planet.  Religious means of encoding culturally important information may not be rational in the sense that Wilson and others understand that term.  They certainly weren't arrived at through a deliberate process of empirical research checked through peer review.  For that matter they often probably didn't arise as deliberate conservation efforts in the first place.  Many of them, however, have been in use for centuries and, as such, have been subjected to generations of cultural evolution which has produced finely tuned institutions, exquisitely sensitive to local environmental contexts.  Surely if biologists can't place any credence on supernatural entities and superstitious articulations of the way the world works they can at least give some respect for systems refined through natural selection!

Finally, religion is hardly unique in its ability "to distract people from recognizing problems of the real world," nor is it alone in leading "them in wrong directions into disastrous actions."  Time and again we have found cases in our work where the leading cause of the breakdown in sustainable resource management by user groups can be traced to either the privatization of the resource in question or, more often, to the usurpation of local user rights through nationalization.  In this latter case, national governments take over control of resources, eliminating any semblance of local autonomy and denying local users any collective choice rights to determine the rules they are expected to follow.  The results of this kind of policy are almost universally disastrous, leading to rapid environmental degradation.

And where did these policy notions come from?  It was decidedly not from the world's religions.  Rather, it came from western scientists and scholars whose thinking was summarized so concisely and compellingly in Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons.  This represents policy based on rational thought and enjoying strong empirical support from modeling studies and laboratory experiments.  In short, it represents exactly the sort of approach that Wilson touts as being inherently superior to the "unsupportable claims" of religious leaders.  It also happens to be completely and disastrously wrong as Elinor Ostrom's work has shown, work for which she earned a Nobel Prize.  I only hope that the damage caused by such superior, rational thinking can be repaired before it's too late for us all.

Why we still wear pants

Peter Turchin recently published a series of blogs (part 1 and part 2) addressing the question of why westerners wear pants.  It's a story I'd heard before years ago in a comparative Indo-European studies course, but not from an expressly evolutionary perspective and not with Peter's flare.  It's a good story, particularly for introducing cultural evolution, and I don't want to spoil it for those who haven't heard it before.  Nevertheless, not much about this post will make sense if I don't at least mention that wearing pants came about whenever riding horses became an important part of warfare.

As much as I like the story, I made what I thought was a somewhat innocuous comment saying that I would like to see a follow up series of blogs that explored why we still wear pants.  After all, very few people ride horses and, aside from some special exceptions, horse cavalry became obsolete in World War 1.  However, not only has the wearing of pants continued, it has spread, both to societies we've come into contact with and to women within our own society.  This spread has happened without any obvious adaptive advantage.  Moreover, this persistence and spread has occurred despite available alternatives and social movements, such as the androgynous movement of the 1980s, that attempted, and failed, to change these established practices.

Peter's response to this question, while not exactly surprising, was surprisingly dismissive.  His position is that there is no need to explain when cultural traits fail to change.  For him, the lack of change is the null hypothesis.  In his own words:

The null model is dp/dt = 0, where p is the frequency of the trait, and dp/dt it’s (sic) rate of change. If there is change, then dp/dt = c, or dp/dt = cp, depending on the details of how the trait changes. In any case, the greater the rate parameter, c, the faster the trait will change. So if c is high enough you will have yearly changes of fashion, if c is small enough, then it will take decades or even centuries.

The failure of something to change, in Peter's view as I understand it, can simply be dismissed as normal inheritance.  In the absence of variation and/or in the absence of selection pressure to change, we simply go on as we've always done.

I object to this position on a number of fronts.  To begin, it appears to be an assumption, not an empirically established fact.  Moreover, all these equations really establish is that some traits change faster than others, hardly a startling revelation.  What they fail utterly to do is account for why some traits change faster than others.  The salient question, for me, is why dp/dt should ever be zero, or even near zero. 

It is, of course, entirely plausible that Peter is right, that the failure of this particular trait to change might be due to simple inertial processes.  However, this is far from the only possibility.  We need only look to biological systems to see why this is so.  Robustness, the propensity of a system to continue functioning in the face of perturbation, is a general property of complex, evolved systems.  The structure of DNA and the genetic code are robust to mutations.  Proteins similarly tend to perform their functions even with amino acid substitutions.  This robustness is evident all the way up the hierarchy of biological complexity.  Even developmental systems are robust to changes in metabolic pathways. 

I see no logical reason to assume this general property of biological systems, a property that is an adaptation in its own right, should somehow no longer hold true once the level of complexity moves outside the skin of the individual organism.  Moreover, if evolutionary approaches to understanding human culture are to meet their full potential, they must grapple with practical problems in the current world, many of which represent historical patterns from which groups seem almost incapable of escaping.  For instance, Nisbett andCohen have traced modern rates of male violence in the southern United States to Celtic herding cultures, an ancestral pattern that has persisted long after herding faded out as a way of life.  Similarly, Robert Putnam has traced failures of democratic institutions in southern Italy to patterns of social capital building that go back 500 years.

Treating the persistence of these problems as nothing more than null hypotheses drastically reduces the chances of finding real solutions.  Aside from blinding ourselves to the root causes of recalcitrance, robustness paradoxically makes evolvability possible.  A handful of textbook examples notwithstanding, it is rare for a single mutation in biological systems to be adaptive.  Most often, adaptations arise from a series of mutations.  Fragile systems, however, are relatively incapable of building pools of useful variation since any slight change is likely to lead to suboptimal performance.  Robust systems, by contrast, tend to build up pools of variation, some combination of which may prove adaptive when new niches present themselves or existing environmental conditions change.

As for the question that ultimately motivated this post, I have no idea why we are still wearing pants.  If I were to hazard a guess, I would say that once pants became associated with warrior castes they acquired protection by virtue of prestige bias.  This in itself, though, might not have been enough to ensure the practice persisted.  More likely, the wearing of pants started to get tied to concepts in addition to warrior attire.  For instance, pants became associated with markers of gender identity, group heritage, etc.  In other words, it became connected to many other cultural constructs in intricate webs not unlike the way genes often have pleiotropic effects in gene networks.  If so, then wearing pants could become difficult to change even if there were compelling reasons to do so.

Sure, this is all purely conjecture at this point.  However, it hopefully goes some ways toward demonstrating that lack of change is a worthy subject for evolutionary study.